Patent Declaration: Reasons and Purposes by Lamping, Matthias & Hilty, Reto M.
UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 6
Issue 3 Patent Sovereignty and International Law Article 7
12-2016





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by
an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Matthias Lamping & Reto M. Hilty, Patent Declaration: Reasons and Purposes, 6 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 469 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol6/iss3/7
Lamping & Hilty_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017 11:37 AM 
 
469 
Patent Declaration: Reasons and Purposes 
Matthias Lamping* and Reto M. Hilty** 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 469 
I. Methodology ................................................................................................................ 474 
II. Rationale ...................................................................................................................... 476 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 481 
INTRODUCTION 
When the first modern patent laws were enacted during the Industrial 
Revolution, states were able to engage in the regulatory design process under 
conditions of high sovereignty. The patent system was expected to promote 
domestic industrialization, so the law was constructed along these lines. Ever since, 
states have continuously relinquished that sovereignty in the name of international 
commerce and trade. The growing opportunities for multinational companies to 
exploit their intellectual assets on international markets has given rise to persistent 
lobbying1 toward the development of common rules, procedures, and minimum 
standards of intellectual property (‘IP’) protection. Today, states face an intricate 
legal regime made up of multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements, which set 
more and more limits to their regulatory autonomy. 
 
* Matthias Lamping is Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition, Munich, and lecturer at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich and the Europa-
Kolleg, Hamburg. 
** Reto M. Hilty is Director of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Full 
Professor ad personam at the University of Zurich, and Honorary Professor at the Ludwig-
Maximilians-University of Munich. 
1. See 2 WILLIAM A. FENNELL & JOSEPH W. TYLER, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A 
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2249 et seq. (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993); Peter Drahos, Global 
Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT, 13 PROMETHEUS 62 (1995); PETER 
DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM (2002); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & 
ROBERT HOWSE, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 406 et seq. (2d ed. 2002); DUNCAN 
MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 et seq. (2002); SUSAN K. SELL, 
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003). 
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The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights2 
(‘TRIPS Agreement’) marks a milestone in the evolution of that regime.3 Unlike 
prior conventions,4 which operated on the basis of reciprocity and thus left national 
sovereignty largely intact, the TRIPS Agreement introduced a very concrete notion 
of IP protection into international—and, consequently, national—law. The 
preamble to the TRIPS Agreement recognizes that IP rights are private rights, 
thereby implying that they ought to be protected by some sort of property right. The 
TRIPS Agreement even tells states how to define such rights in terms of the subject 
matter, the requirements and the scope of protection, and the exceptions and 
limitations thereto. In doing so, it wields considerable influence on how 
governments regulate their national innovation markets. Despite its roots in 
international trade law,5 TRIPS is much more about market regulation than trade 
liberalization;6 it is far more intrusive on states’ sovereignty than what would have 
been necessary in light of its overarching objective—i.e., liberalizing international 
trade by internalizing cross-border externalities.7 
 
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
3. See William Cornish & Kathleen Liddell, The Origins and Structure of the TRIPS Agreement, 
in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES 4 et seq. (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds., 
2016). 
4. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at 
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886; International Convention for the Protection 
of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 
43; Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1483. 
5. The TRIPS Agreement is part of Annex 1 to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], just like the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 [hereinafter GATT] and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 
15, 1994 [hereinafter GATS]. 
6. See William Cornish & Kathleen Liddell, supra note 3, at 3 et seq.; Hanns Ullrich, The Political 
Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 3, at 85 et seq.; Josef Drexl, The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 3, at 53 et seq.; Matthias Lamping, Intellectual Property Harmonization in the Name of Trade, in 
TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 313 et seq. 
7. Without harmonization, countries could free ride on the innovative capacities of others while 
not contributing to the social costs entailed in the development of these capacities (including access 
restrictions and, concomitantly, higher prices for IP protected goods and services). In theory, this 
distorts the conditions of interstate competition, because countries with weak(er) IP systems benefit 
from positive externalities created in countries with strong(er) IP systems. Harmonization levels the 
playing field by internalizing these cross-border externalities. This is also part of the explanation for 
why the TRIPS Agreement follows a minimum standards approach. If the goal is to internalize positive 
externalities, there is no need to worry about other countries granting too much protection. 
Unfortunately, this is likely to create a vicious circle. As soon as a country raises its level of protection 
beyond the agreed standards, it creates new positive externalities to its detriment. It will therefore try 
to induce other states to also raise their level of protection by arguing that this is the only way to restore 
the fairness of interstate competition and international trade. See infra note 20. 
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Although countries have learned to live with the TRIPS Agreement, none 
seem to be particularly happy with it.8 For the industrialized world, the World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’)—which is responsible for the administration of the 
Agreement—has proven to be a brake as much as it used to be an accelerator. After 
the collapse of the Ministerial Conferences at Seattle in 1999 and Cancún in 2003, 
most developed countries turned their backs on the multilateral approach and 
pursued bilateral and regional free trade agreements (‘FTAs’) among like-minded in 
order to further their interests in strong patent protection.9 In turn, developing 
countries soon began to regret the horse trade they had concluded by committing 
themselves to increase their level of protection in return for a mere promise of 
market access (mainly to textile, apparel, and agriculture markets)10 and a distant 
hope for technology transfer (mainly through trade in capital and technology goods, 
foreign direct investments, and licensing).11 During the Uruguay Round, the TRIPS 
Agreement was propagated as a means to bridging the innovation gap between the 
developed and the developing world.12 Today, it is increasingly suspected of having 
mainly served mercantilist interests of a few advanced economies.13 Although 
economists support the view that stronger patent protection can be associated with 
an increase in foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) and inbound licensing,14 there are 
 
8. See, e.g., GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION 
OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 14 et seq. 
(2012); Graham Dutfield, North/South: An Asymmetric Global Market?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND MARKET POWER 180 et seq. (Gustavo Ghidini & Luis Mariano Genovesi eds., 2008); Peter K. Yu, 
Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in 4 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 73, 77 et seq. 
(Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). 
9. See JOSEF DREXL, HENNING GROSSE RUSE-KHAN & SOUHEIR, EU BILATERAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? (2014); Henning Grosse 
Ruse-Khan et al., Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 44 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. COMP. L. 878 (2013); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical 
Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011). 
10. See DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 8, at 32; KEITH E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS 
AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 95 (2012); Thomas Dreier, Shaping a Fair International IPR-Regime in a Globalized World: 
Some Parameters for Public Policy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 43, 50 (Inge Govaere & Hanns Ullrich eds., 2007). 
11. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods 
and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 11 (Keith E. Maskus 
& Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). 
12. See Daniel Gervais, Current Issues in International Intellectual Property Norm-Making, in EU 
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? 5 
( Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2014). 
13. See, e.g., RICHARD NEWFARMER ET AL., GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR THE WORLD’S POOR 129 (2002); Phillip 
McCalman, Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent Harmonization, 55 J. 
INT’L ECON. 161 (2001). 
14. See Lee Branstetter et al., Intellectual Property Rights, Imitation, and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Theory and Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13033, 2007); Amy Jocelyn 
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not many signs of increased domestic innovation, technology transfer, or learning 
spillovers in the developing world.15 The policy implications of patent protection in 
areas such as health, nutrition or education are, on the other hand, quite 
conspicuous.16 
The evolution of international patent law is compounded by increasing 
imbalances and dysfunctionalities within the patent system itself.17 In recent 
decades, the position of patentees has continuously been reinforced: the burdens 
and costs for applicants have been reduced, international prosecution has been 
facilitated, the subject matter of rights has been expanded, the scope of protection 
has been extended, and enforcement measures have been strengthened. On the 
other hand, the rights and interests of all others affected by the system—
competitors, scientists, users, consumers, and the public at large—are rarely 
attended to. Thanks to its intriguing simplicity, the fallacy of more protection equals 
more innovation continues to exert a seemingly magical attraction on policymakers 
worldwide. The assumption that exclusivity is better at promoting innovation than 
competition is probably one of the biggest and most disconcerting misconceptions 
of modern patent law and policy—and yet, strong patent protection remains at the 
core of most legislators’ innovation agenda. 
While strong patent protection can be conducive to the development of an 
economy or industry, it can also have the opposite effect. Patent systems are 
 
Glass & Kamal Saggi, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 56 J. INT’L ECON. 387 (2002); 
Pamela J. Smith, How Do Foreign Patent Rights Affect U.S. Exports, Affiliate Sales and Licenses?, 55 J. 
INT’L ECON. 411 (2001). 
15. See MASKUS, supra note 10, at 314. However, in the vast majority of cases, this does not 
come as a surprise. Knowledge is a good to be collected, not a debt to be provided. Technology transfer 
across borders will only take place where the receiving country offers attractive innovation and 
investment conditions. Patent rights can be an effective means of supporting FDI and inbound 
licensing, but they are only one—very often overestimated—element in a far broader set of influences 
that define the attractiveness of a foreign market, including political and social stability, taxation, 
investment law, commercial and corporate law, trade law, the labour market, or competition law. See 
Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and 
Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109 (1998). For empirical evidence, see Edwin 
Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment, Technology Transfer, and 
Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 140 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993). 
16. In order to address the concerns of the developing world, the Ministerial Conference at 
Doha in 2001 launched the Doha Development Agenda. Although the overall progress on the ground 
seems to have been rather modest, developing countries have had at least some success in consolidating 
what is left of their regulatory autonomy in relation to certain critical public goods, such as health care. 
See WTO, Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 Nov. 2001, ¶¶ 17 et seq., WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002); WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, adopted on 14 Nov. 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 755 (2002); WTO, 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Decision of the General Council of 30 Aug. 2003, WTO Doc. WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003). 
17. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS—HOW 
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT (2004). 
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regulatory institutions. Countries have different needs, aspirations, and capabilities, 
and thus different views on the goals and priorities of their patent systems—e.g., 
increasing innovation, enhancing economic efficiency, encouraging technology 
transfer and dissemination, supporting domestic industries, attracting foreign 
investors, making trade gains, or avoiding trade losses. Depending on their levels of 
development, countries also have different views on the optimal level of protection. 
Economic evidence may be rare, but history speaks a clear language: it is a historical 
fact that the level of protection declines “as economies move beyond the poorest 
stage into a middle-income stage in which they have greater abilities to imitate” and 
then increases again as they become “more innovative at the highest levels of 
income.”18 With little to no prospect of gaining a comparative advantage as a 
technology producer (and exporter), a country will presumably have little to no 
interest in providing a high level of protection for technologies of which it will 
remain an imitator in the foreseeable future.19 In their own best interests, most 
WTO member states would thus arguably, if they were not forced to do otherwise, 
provide weaker patent protection than what their more advanced trading partners 
consider “effective” and “adequate” from a—or rather, their—trade perspective.20 
Lastly, states may also have different views on the nature of intellectual property as 
a social institution,21 its relation to other public policies, and its hierarchical status 
within the canon of constitutional rights. 
The extent to which sovereign states can go their own way—by defining their 
own laws and policies—depends on the obligations they have assumed under 
international law. In the patent context, international law determines specific 
minimum standards of protection, but devotes—if at all—only cursory attention to 
the flip side of the coin, namely the protection of those whose freedom to operate 
is restrained by the exclusionary right granted to the patent holder.22 Because the 
 
18. Keith E. Maskus, The International Regulation of Intellectual Property, 134 
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 186, 192 (1998); see also B. Zorina Khan, Intellectual Property and 
Economic Development: Lessons from American and European History (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Study Paper 1a, 2002); Nagesh Kumar, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and 
Economic Development: Experiences of Asian Countries (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Study Paper 1b, 2002); NEWFARMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 139 et seq. 
19. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 1, at 314; Maskus & Reichman, supra note 11, at 10. 
20. The problem here is that the “marriage of convenience” (see supra note 7) between patent 
and trade law creates an artificial dependency between the due level of national patent protection and 
the functioning of the international trading system. This shifts the perspective from what is considered 
“effective” and “adequate” (see preamble to the TRIPS Agreement) in terms of national innovation 
policy to what is considered “effective” and “adequate” in terms of international commerce and trade—
i.e., from the perspective of more innovative countries that have adopted strong(er) patent systems and 
are therefore creating positive externalities for countries with weak(er) patent systems. From their point 
of view, any level of patent protection lower than what they consider appropriate for themselves would 
allegedly be “ineffective” and “inadequate” in terms of international trade. See Lamping, supra note 6, at 
344 et seq. 
21. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996). 
22. See Annette Kur, From Minimum Standards to Maximum Rules, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM 
TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 133 et seq.; Annette Kur & Henning Grosse 
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provisions of international IP treaties like the Paris Convention23 and the TRIPS 
Agreement are frequently open-textured—or at least constructively ambiguous—
and therefore generally leave to states considerable discretion regarding their 
implementation,24 it is important to be clear about the exact scope of that discretion. 
States need to know all their options in order to make informed policy choices. At 
the end of the day, it is their responsibility to ensure that the patent system works 
in harmony with the market economy it is supposed to serve, without encroaching 
upon the social order within which it is embedded.  
In view of these considerations, a multinational group of patent scholars has 
taken up the challenge to rebut the widespread assumption that the TRIPS 
Agreement requires states to implement a high level of patent protection and leaves 
little space for pursuing national public interest goals. The work of this group 
culminated in a document that marks the interpretive borders of the international 
patent regime: the Declaration on Patent Protection25 (‘Patent Declaration’). The 
Patent Declaration seeks to clarify some of the regulatory options that states retain 
with regard to the design of their patent systems. It is ultimately about sovereignty 
and the right to self-government. Its aim is to make policymakers, legislators, courts, 
and other authorities involved in the administration of the patent system aware of 
the fact that the TRIPS Agreement gives them much more leeway than commonly 
assumed—i.e., that there are many ways to pursue national interests without 
violating international law. 
I. METHODOLOGY 
The Patent Declaration is an apolitical, minimalistic approach to the 
interpretation of the obligations that international law imposes on states. In order 
to elucidate the methodology behind the Declaration, it appears instructive to focus 
on what the Patent Declaration is not rather than what it is: 
(1) The Patent Declaration is not a political paper. It supports the position of 
neither developed nor developing countries. Both sides will occasionally be faced 
with dysfunctionalities within the patent system and imbalances between the rights 
and obligations conferred with a patent. Accordingly, both sides will occasionally 
have to reconsider their laws and legal practice in order to bring their systems back 
on track. It would be a capital mistake to assume that the regulatory leeway 
 
Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough—The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property 
Protection, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORM OF TRIPS 359 et seq. (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin eds., 2011). 
23. See supra note 4. 
24. See ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1278 
(9th ed. 1992), for a definition of the principle of in dubio mitius, which demands that if the meaning 
of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which limits the sovereignty of the obliged party 
less. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 165, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998). 
25. Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. COMPETITION L. 679 (2014) [hereinafter Patent Declaration]. 
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determined by the Patent Declaration is only relevant for developing countries that 
have no ambitions of becoming innovative themselves. 
(2) The Patent Declaration should not be understood as a menu of policy 
recommendations. The focus on what could be done as opposed to what should be 
done is a matter of methodology and should not be mistaken for a political 
statement. The Patent Declaration demonstrates policy space available to states. 
However, it does not provide policy advice. Whether it is advisable or, indeed, 
beneficial—in terms of innovation, development, or any other conceivable policy 
objective—to make use of the regulatory leeway identified in the Patent Declaration 
can only be answered in consideration of the concrete circumstances of the 
individual case. Without knowledge of the technological capabilities as well as the 
socioeconomic needs and priorities of a country, it is impossible to give a serious 
answer to the question of which options should be implemented and how they 
should be combined in order to best promote the objectives attached to the national 
patent system. Whether leeway is available is a matter of legal interpretation; 
whether it is sensible to exploit such is a matter of political preferences. The Patent 
Declaration is about the former, not about the latter.  
(3) The Patent Declaration does not aspire to resolve any of the constructive 
ambiguities that have been built into the TRIPS Agreement. Unless a specific 
meaning follows from the wording or context, member states shall adopt their own 
definitions and draw their own conclusions. 
(4) The Patent Declaration does not propose changes to the TRIPS 
Agreement,26 and it does not reinterpret its provisions in order to create regulatory 
autonomy contrary to what has been mutually agreed upon during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. 
(5) The Patent Declaration is not bound by WTO jurisprudence. Even though 
the rulings adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) are regarded as strong 
precedents, they do not constitute an official interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement. There is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement.  
(6) The Patent Declaration is not an academic paper. It therefore eschews 
explaining the legal reasoning behind its statements and findings in greater detail. 
The reason for that lies in its target audience. It is not the academic community but 
primarily policymakers and legislators who are addressed. Needless to say, this does 
not mean that the legal analysis has not been made. The Declaration has been 
drafted on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of the TRIPS Agreement’s 
negotiation history, academic literature, and WTO jurisprudence. 
 
26. See, e.g., ANNETTE KUR & MARIANNE LEVIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A 
FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF TRIPS (2011). 
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II. RATIONALE 
Harmonization can reduce transaction costs, but it also tends to reduce the 
responsiveness of the law to the specific conditions and needs of the economy.27 
What works for one country may not work for another, what works today may not 
work tomorrow, and what is good for international trade is not necessarily good for 
national development. Patent rights are attributed to individuals and thus protected 
by exclusivity,28 but they are to ultimately serve the public good by fostering 
technological progress for the benefit of society as a whole.29 This requires the rights 
and obligations encompassed in a patent right to be defined, justified, and 
continually reconsidered by reference to its specific socioeconomic benefits and 
costs. International law should, to the extent possible, be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of the states’ freedom to weigh up the costs 
and benefits of their patent system and seek, within the bounds of good faith, to 
correct and prevent socioeconomic inefficiencies. Despite the need for a certain 
coordination of patent policies and laws as a means of internalizing—at least 
reducing—jurisdictional externalities30 and thereby facilitating international 
commerce and trade, every state remains responsible for the functioning of its own 
system: (1) for the functional efficiency of patent protection, and (2) for the 
compatibility of patent protection with the objectives of other public policies. A 
certain degree of regulatory autonomy is crucial on both counts.  
Functional efficiency refers to the intrinsic functionality of the patent system 
as a competition regulator. Innovation is a dynamic process driven by competitive 
pressure and the prospect of temporary market exclusivity due to first-mover 
advantages. The design of the patent system and the competitive order of the 
affected innovation and product markets are therefore inherently interdependent. 
Patents may be designed as property rights, but the patent system is not intended 
to operate as a property regime. It is conceived as a “framework regulation of the 
market economy.”31 The priority objective of the patent system is to preserve 
 
27. See Matthias Lamping, supra note 6, at 313 et seq. 
28. For an economic perspective, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of 
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 et seq. (Richard 
Nelson ed., 1962); FRITZ MACHLUP, 1 KNOWLEDGE, ITS CREATION DISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC 
SIGNIFICANCE 160 et seq. (1983); CHRISTOPHER T. TAYLOR & ZANGWILL A. SILBERSTON, THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 24 et seq. 
(1973). For the theoretical fundamentals, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 
36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). 
29. Think, for example, of art. 14(2) of the German Constitution, which reads: “Property entails 
obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.” The programmatic beauty of this provision may 
be hard to resemble in legal practice, but it has—or at least should have—a subliminal effect on the 
interpretation and application of ordinary statutory law. 
30. See supra note 7. 
31. See Hanns Ullrich, Intellectual Property: Exclusive Rights for a Purpose—The Case of 
Technology Protection by Patents and Copyright (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law Research Paper No. 13-01, 2012); Hanns Ullrich, Propriété Intellectuelle, Concurrence 
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effective competition at the invention and innovation levels. It is supposed to 
anticipate situations in which first-mover advantages could be mitigated by market 
dynamics to an extent that would discourage the first mover from inventing in the 
first place. Although the promotion of innovation underlines the classical rationale 
of the patent system, patents are neither granted to reward the inventor nor to 
encourage him to invent. Patents as such do not promote innovation—they protect 
market opportunities. This protection is not about providing incentives to innovate, 
but about preserving them. The main purpose of patent protection is to prevent a 
market failure due to the innovation incentives of market participants being 
suppressed as a result of the ability of competitors to free ride on the innovator’s 
achievements—in other words, due to “chronic” inability of the market to allocate 
market revenues according to market performance.32 
It follows from the above that a competitive market is a prerequisite for any 
patent system to operate properly, and that patent law must provide for appropriate 
measures—both prior to and after the patent has been granted—to ensure that 
patent protection does not interfere with the proper functioning of that market, 
including all related upstream and downstream markets. In terms of regulatory 
policy, this functional interdependence of the patent system and the competitive 
order poses a twofold challenge that must be tackled within the parameters of 
international law, in particular the TRIPS Agreement: unless there is a risk of market 
failure, states should not be obliged to intervene in the innovation process, and once 
granted, patent rights need to be recognized only to the extent that they do not 
unduly restrain competition and innovation. Where the exclusionary effects of 
patent protection go beyond what is necessary and sufficient to prevent a market 
failure, the patent lacks economic legitimacy. Consequently, the functional 
efficiency of a patent system will heavily depend on the specific market and 
technology environment within which it is expected to operate as an incentive, 
compensation, and distribution mechanism. 
Besides being functionally efficient, a patent system must be in harmony with 
other public policies. Due to technology’s continual expansion into more and more 
spheres of life, the system’s intrinsic rationale of promoting innovation by allocating 
exclusive exploitation rights is increasingly confronted with other policy objectives 
and priorities. The functioning of the patent system as a social institution that 
benefits society as a whole depends heavily on whether patent protection can be 
reconciled with such objectives and priorities. 
From a meta perspective, innovation is just one state goal among many others, 
such as economic growth, employment, protecting the environment, preserving 
biodiversity, sustainability, scientific progress, affordable access to health care and 
 
et Regulation: Limites de Protection et Limites de Contrôle, in REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
ÉCONOMIQUE 399 (2009) (Fr.). 
32. See Eric Hoppman, Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs: Bemerkungen zu Kantzenbachs 
Erwiderung, 3 J. ECON. & STAT. 16 et seq. (1967). 
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nutrition, education, or security. The importance of such policies is explicitly 
recognized in the TRIPS Agreement, which relativizes the member states’ 
substantive obligations by embedding them into a system of socioeconomic policy 
controls.33 At the same time, however, these policy controls are made subject to 
compliance with the very same provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that may be at 
the root of the policy conflict.34 If this were to be interpreted restrictively (literally), 
it would create a hierarchy between the standards of patent protection established 
by the TRIPS Agreement and the attainment of other public policy objectives. Apart 
from functional concerns, this would also be irreconcilable with the international 
legal order,35 in which the TRIPS Agreement is just one treaty among many others, 
all with their own goals and priorities. TRIPS requires states to protect IP according 
to specific minimum standards, but it does not—and cannot—alter the status of 
IP protection in relation to other public policies.36 There is no ground for 
interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in a manner that generally gives patent 
protection priority over other public policy objectives. This would not only be 
incompatible with a series of international treaties; the policy trade-offs that such 
an interpretation would necessarily presuppose were also never a subject of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.37 
The consistency requirement should thus be understood as a proportionality 
assessment directed against an arbitrary or excessive use of socioeconomic policy 
correctives.38 If states have a legitimate reason for acting contrary to an obligation 
under the TRIPS Agreement on grounds of important public interests,39 the 
consistency requirement should not—and does not—prevent them from doing 
 
33. See the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 8(1), which confirms the member states’ 
freedom to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development,” and art. 
8(2), which states that “appropriate measures . . . may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology.”  
34. Both paragraphs of art. 8 of the TRIPS Agreement are only applicable to the extent that the 
adopted measures “are consistent with the provisions of the Agreement.” (emphasis added). 
35. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10, 
1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) 
(Dec. 16, 1966). For an extensive analysis, see Klaus D. Bieter, Establishing Conformity Between TRIPS 
and Human Rights, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 
445 et seq. 
36. See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 108 (2007). 
37. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. & INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND 
DEV. [UNCTAD/ICTSD], RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 551 et seq. (2005). 
38. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 37, at 552. 
39. See WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 16, ¶ 4, which 
can be applied by analogy to other public policies. With regard to the legitimacy of the policy objective 
pursued, see Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.69, WT/DS114/R 
(adopted Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Canada—Pharmaceuticals], defining the term “legitimate interests” 
as “a normative claim calling for protection of interests that are ‘justifiable’ in the sense that they are 
supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.” 
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such, as long as the adopted measure is: appropriate to achieve the objective 
pursued; necessary to achieve the objective pursued (i.e., there are no less restrictive 
means of achieving it);40 and proportional in terms of the expected benefits and 
costs (i.e., all interests at stake are duly taken into account). 
The proportionality assessment reflects the need for a balance between, on the 
one hand, preserving member states’ freedom to “set and achieve regulatory 
objectives through measures of their own choosing” and, on the other hand, 
“discouraging [them] from adopting or maintaining measures that unduly restrict 
trade” without serving a legitimate public policy interest.41 There should be no 
doubt that, in certain situations, a coordination of conflicting public policies may 
require measures that are contrary to, or at least on the brink of what can be squared 
with the wording of the TRIPS Agreement. In that case, as long as the measure 
adopted serves a legitimate purpose and complies with the principle of 
proportionality, the end should be able to justify the means. After all, the TRIPS 
Agreement must be implemented in a manner supportive of the member states’ 
freedom to make their own policy choices. Each member state retains the right to 
define its public policy objectives and priorities,42 their relative importance, and the 
desired level of attainment.43 As long as such policy choices are based on a proper 
exercise of discretion,44 they should be respected. 
Both in terms of functional efficiency and public policy coordination, there 
are strong arguments in favour of regulatory diversity.45 The socioeconomic 
implications of the patent system vary in costs and benefits by country, technology, 
and over time. Patent law affects markets in a wide range of industry sectors ranging 
from nutrition to banking, and it influences entrepreneurial processes throughout 
the entire lifetime of a technology, from the initial investment decision through the 
end of the product life cycle. The evolution of new technologies and business 
models has exposed considerable differences in both the characteristics of 
technologies across sectors and in how industries innovate and make use of—their 
 
40. See Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.26, L/6439 
(adopted Nov. 7, 1989) GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at 345 (1989); Appellate Body Report, Korea—
Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 161, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001). 
41. WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, “Necessity Tests” in the WTO, Note by the 
Secretariat, ¶ 4, WTO Doc. S/WPDR/W/27/Add. 1 ( Jan. 18, 2011). 
42. For the purposes of dispute settlement, it is not the necessity of the policy objective that can 
be subject to review, but only the necessity of the measure chosen to achieve that objective. See WTO 
Working Party on Domestic Regulation, supra note 41, ¶¶ 4, 14 et seq. 
43. See WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, supra note 41, ¶¶ 4, 24 et seq. 
44. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 37, at 127 et seq.; DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 2.86 (3d ed. 2008); CARLOS M. CORREA, supra 
note 36, at 105 et seq.; NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 8.8 (3d 
ed. 2010).  
45. See Matthias Lamping, supra note 6, at 313 et seq.; Rupprecht Podszun & Benjamin Franz, 
Regulatory Innovation and the Institutional Design of the TRIPS Agreement, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM 
TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 279 et seq. 
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own as well as others’—innovations on the marketplace. Every technology is more 
or less unique in terms of the level of protection required to induce upfront 
investments in research and development, the exceptions and limitations required 
to facilitate follow-on innovation, and the impact of patent protection on the 
conditions of competition on the affected markets. It is thus highly unlikely that a 
uniform patent system will optimally promote efficiency and progress in the wide 
range of technology sectors it is expected to cover.46 For a patent system to be 
functionally efficient, in harmony with other public policies, and responsive to 
changing circumstances, it must internalize the differences between technologies 
and industries. This cannot be done on the basis of a “one size fits all” approach. It 
rather requires the legislator’s full attention to the specific patterns of innovation 
and market development in each technology sector, and to how these patterns 
evolve over time. 
Contrary to popular belief, differentiation is not inconsistent with international 
law—actually, it is quite the contrary. According to the TRIPS Agreement, “patents 
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the field 
of technology.”47 At its broadest, the term discrimination covers all kinds of 
differential treatment. However, this would not only jeopardize the functional 
efficiency of the patent system—which requires regulatory interventions in the 
market to be minimally invasive—but would also be incompatible with the concept 
of discrimination implied in the national treatment and most-favoured-nation 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.48 Rather, discrimination should be interpreted 
in light of the principle of equal treatment or substantive equality: Equal situations 
should not be treated differently and different situations should not be treated 
alike.49 
With this in mind, a differential treatment of technologies, or even industries, 
is not only explicitly allowed under the TRIPS Agreement, but may even be required 
in order to avoid discriminatory results—i.e., in order to avoid a situation where 
market effects of patent protection vary among different technologies and 
industries, thereby distorting the natural competitive order of the economy as a 
whole. This would be irreconcilable with the notion of the patent system as a 
 
46. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1675 et seq. (2003). 
47. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(1). 
48. See Canada—Pharmaceuticals, supra note 39, ¶ 7.94. 
49. See Lionel Bently et al., Standing Committee on the Law of Patents: Exclusions from Patentable 
Subject Matter and Exceptions and Limitations to the Rights, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION [WIPO], 41 WIPO Doc. SCP/15/3, Annex 1 (2011); CARVALHO, supra note 44, ¶¶ 
27.55, 27.8; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying without Discriminating, 13 
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 445, 452 (2007); GERVAIS, supra note 44, at ¶ 2.249; CARLOS M. 
CORREA, supra note 36, at 282; Thomas Cottier, From Progressive Liberalization to Progressive Regulation 
in the WTO Law, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 796 (2006); UNCTAD/ICTSD, supra note 37, at 368. This 
interpretation of the non-discrimination requirement is also supported by the DSB. See, e.g., Canada—
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 39, ¶¶ 7.92, 7.94, 7.101. 
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“framework regulation of the market economy”50 Patents ought to protect 
competition as an institution—without influencing the competitive process. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Renaissance, the patent system has been used by governments to 
control the development of their domestic economies. They were able to adjust the 
balance of static and dynamic efficiency (i.e., effectively exploiting existing 
knowledge while maintaining sufficient incentives for the production of further 
knowledge) in light of their current technological capabilities as well as their 
socioeconomic needs and priorities. This allowed them to develop and consolidate 
areas of comparative advantage in the sectors they considered to be most important 
for national development. As a matter of fact, many of today’s industrialized nations 
look back on a long and fruitful tradition as “imitators”.51 
The evolution of the international legal regime has made it much more difficult 
for states to pursue such strategies,52 but it still gives them considerable leeway in 
 
50. See Hanns Ullrich, supra note 31. 
51. See Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: 
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247 (2009); Graham Dutfield & Uma Suthersanen, 
Harmonisation or Differentiation in Intellectual Property Protection? The Lessons of History, 23 
PROMETHEUS 131, 135 et seq. (2005); HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13 et seq. (2002); Linsu Kim, Technology 
Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights: Lessons from Korea’s Experience (UNCTAD/ICTSD, Working 
Paper Issue N. 2, 2002); Ha-Joon Chang, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development: 
Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 288 et seq. (2001); Jakob Tanner, The Swiss 
Pharmaceutical Industry: The Impact of Industrial Property Rights and Trust in the Laboratory, 1907–
1939, in DETERMINANTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, 1900–1939 
257 et seq. (Anthony S. Travis et al. eds., 1998); Cristian Simon, The Rise of the Swiss Chemical Industry 
Reconsidered, in THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 1850–1914: INDUSTRIAL GROWTH, 
POLLUTION, AND PROFESSIONALIZATION 17 et seq. (Ernst Homburg et al. eds., 1998); Jerome H. 
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 NYU 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 11 et seq. (1996); CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS?: THE RISE OF THE 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 74 et seq. (1995); Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and 
Exclusion, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 et seq. (1991); DAVID J. JEREMY, TRANSATLANTIC INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION: THE DIFFUSION OF TEXTILE TECHNOLOGIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND AMERICA, 
1790–1830S 8 et seq. (1981). 
52. Whether this is a good or a bad thing is a matter of perspective. Just as imitation is an 
integral part of innovation (see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
83 (5th ed. 1994)), global welfare may well benefit from the developing states temporarily free-riding 
on—or, to put it in positive terms, learning from—the technological achievements of the developed 
world. After all, competition is the driving force of all progress—not only within a state’s economy, but 
also among states as economic actors. There may even be a role for the WTO here. The preamble to 
the WTO Agreement explicitly recognizes the need for “positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.” Furthermore, it 
recognizes that the relations between the member states “in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living . . . while allowing for the optimal use of 
the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development.” It is obviously 
difficult to derive any concrete rights or obligations from these statements, but it could be said that they 
do imply a certain commitment on behalf of the more advanced economies toward actively reducing 
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order to make sure that their patent systems are functionally efficient and in 
harmony with other public policies. The Patent Declaration suggests that much of 
the hostility shown to the TRIPS Agreement—mostly by developing countries—
may be owed to a failure to recognize the actual autonomy afforded by the 
Agreement with regard to its implementation in national law. 
Despite all due respect for the social, economic, and cultural needs and 
aspirations of states, it would be naïve not to recognize that IP regulation can no 
longer be treated as a purely domestic matter. The coalescence of national 
economies has turned it into an international concern that requires collective action. 
The effects of a country’s IP policy will not stop at its national borders, nor will a 
country remain unaffected by repercussions of other countries’ IP policies. States 
are no longer only responsible for their own people and markets, and national 
markets can no longer be regulated without the involvement of multinational 
public—and increasingly also private—actors. As a result of globalization, internal 
market regulation has become a shared responsibility of individual nation states and 
the international community of states—a responsibility that needs to be exercised 
jointly, with mutual respect for both national and international concerns. For better 
or worse, international politics has become an integral aspect of domestic 
governance. 
However, this does not mean that states should place the fate of their IP 
systems into the hands of their trading partners; they should rather, wherever 
possible, resist the temptation to barter their regulatory sovereignty for trade 
concessions. It just means that they may occasionally have to make public policy 
choices that are not fully in line with their own best interests. Nota bene, may is the 
operative word here. Policy choices always involve trade-offs. International law 
imposes obligations on states, but it does not—and cannot—make these trade-offs. 
It does not balance producers’ and users’ interests, enhance social welfare, or 
promote the functioning of national innovation markets—all of which is stated, or 
at least implied,53 in the TRIPS Agreement. Making these trade-offs is not only left 
to the discretion but also to the responsibility of the member states. Sovereignty 
entails the freedom to choose as well as the obligation to bear the consequences. It 
is certainly no panacea, but surely worth protecting as an end in itself. 
 
 
the development gap. It could therefore be argued that the WTO—being a member-driven institution 
built on the principle of solidarity—bears a certain responsibility for building a bridge between the 
industrialized economies and those who lag behind, so that the latter can benefit from the former 
without the former being exploited by the latter. 
53. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at arts. 7, 8. 
